This paper is part of a large literature on "degree of manipulability." A rule may be thought of as less manipulable if it is manipulable at fewer profiles [Peleg (1979) ; Nitzan (1985) ; Chamberlain (1985) ; Lepelley and Mbih (1987) ; Saari (1990) ; Kelly (1993) ; Kim and Roush (1996) ].
As a special case, one could seek rules manipulable at a minimum number of profiles [Kelly (1988) ; Fristrup and Keiding (1998) ; Maus, Peters, and Storcken (2005a , 2005b , 2005c , 2005d ]. Alternatively, a rule is less manipulable if there is a smaller number of manipulating strategies [Chamberlain (1985) ; Smith (1999) ; Aleskerov and Kurbanov (1999) ], if more information is required to determine a manipulating strategy [Nurmi (1987) ], if the average size of a manipulating coalition must be larger [Chamberlain (1985) ; Lepelley and Mbih (1994) ; Pritchard and Slinko (2006) ], or if there exist countercoalitions to manipulations [Pattanaik (1976a [Pattanaik ( , 1976b [Pattanaik ( , 1978 ; Favardin, Lepelley, and Serias (2002) ].
Here we explore a different approach: If a rule allows only small gains from manipulation, we may be persuaded that the cost to the individual of gathering enough information about the preferences of others to ensure that manipulation is advantageous will not yield a gain once those costs are factored in. A referee has directed our attention to two papers that have looked at the possibility of allowing small gains from manipulation, Schummer (2004) and Ehlers, Peters, and Storcken (2004) . Both of these papers work in a very different context than we consider here. + For them, the feasible set is a continuum, ú for Schummer and ú for Ehlers et al. They thus 2m can not measure gains by number of ranks risen and have to introduce very restricted utility functions to measure gains: linear for Schummer and Lipschitz continuous for Ehlers et al. Our analysis assumes a finite number of alternatives, (unrestricted) strong preferences, and Just as the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem has to distinguish dictatorial from nondictatorial rules, so we will find the gain of a rule to be closely related to the extent to which a rule favors some individual, by which we mean, in this paper, the extent to which some individual can precipitate the chosen alternative to be from some initial segment of their ordering. Two Page -7-and so we have G(f) = k -1. In summary, f(p) is forced to be in p(1)[1:k] and G(f) = k -1.
Example 2.3. X = {w,x,y,z} and n = 3. At any profile u, at least one alternative is not anyone's last. Take f(u) to be the alphabetically earliest alternative that no one ranks last . Then 23 f(u) can not be u(j)[4] for anyone; so no one can gain more than two ranks. The largest gain an individual can realize is to go from 3 to 1 ; for this rule, G(f) = 2.
rd st Section 3. General remarks.
The examples of the previous section suggest relating gain to the extent to which individuals can precipitate the chosen alternative to be from initial segments of their ordering. We illustrate the possibility of small gain with three examples. The first has a range that is a proper subset of X.
12 m Example 4.1. X = {x , x , ..., x } and let k be an integer between 1 and m -1 inclusive.
jj Let f(p) be the alphabetically earliest alternative x 0 X such that x is one of the top k alternatives in the ordering p(i), for some individual i. This is an anonymous rule for which ñ(f) = m. (For   11 example, if x is at the bottom of p(1) and at the top of p(2) then f(p) = x .) However, we will see that, depending on the size of k, G(f) can be significantly less than m -1. Consider profile p:
Then f(p) = x but person 1 can get x , which ranks in position k+1 in p(1), by reporting an 1 ordering with x on top. Therefore, G(f) $ m ! k ! 1. We can also see that G(f) $ k ! 1 by Here, f(q) = x ; but if individual #1 interchanges x and x , the outcome will be x and #1
will have gained k -1 ranks. In fact, for this f,
suffices to observe that no individual has the ability to change the outcome of the rule from one of his bottom m -k to one of his top k.
Note that there are k -1 alternatives that are never selected by f. For arbitrary profile p, To show a gain of t -1 is possible, consider profile u: The modification raise b to rank t + 1.
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Since t > t , alternatives a, b, ..., k are assigned 1 by individual #1, and those alternatives get a score of just 1 while the score of the other alternatives is at least n-1 $ 1. By the tie-break,
. If u* is obtained from u by interchanging p and b for individual 1, then the 2 score of b decreases to 0 and f(u*) = b, a gain of t -1 ranks.
The same results could all be achieved if instead of an alphabetic tie-break we had used, say, individual #2's ranking as the tie-break. Now construct a new rule g, as follows: If at u there is an alternative x that is at the top of two or three individual rankings, then g(u) = x; otherwise g(u) = f(u). Now ñ(g) = 100 because one individual's bottom will be selected if it is at the top for the other two. But, G(g) = 66. To see this, it suffices to see that no one manipulates away from an alternative that is selected when it is at two or more tops. Obviously, G(g) = 66 is consistent with Gain Conjecture #2.
Section 5. Condorcet.
In this section we compute the gain to manipulation when we impose the condition that f is a Condorcet rule. Say x is a strong Condorcet winner if |{i : x y}| > |{i : y x}| for all y in 67 33 for every alternative x and every profile p, if x is a strong Condorcet winner at p, then f(p) = x.
Condorcet rules are non-dictatorial, have range X, and (if n > 2) have ñ(f) = m. Note that for n = 2, Condorcet does not imply ñ(f) = m; the case n = 2 will be taken up later in this section. Example 5.3. Let n = 2 and X = {x,y,z,w} with f(u) determined by a sequence of steps:
Step 1. If at profile u, anyone has w at her top, f(u) = w.
Step 2. If at profile u, both individuals have the same alternative á 0 {x,y,z} at their top, then f(u) = á.
Step 3. If at profile u neither Steps 1 nor 2 apply, consider the following list of orderings:
zw; yw; xw; zy; zx; yz; yx.
At least one individual must have one of those orderings as their initial segment. Pick the individual with the initial segment of their order, say áâ, earliest in the list. Then f(u) is that alternative in {á,â} that is preferred by the other individual.
First ñ(f) = 4 as w will be chosen when it is at one person's bottom and at the other's top.
It can be shown that only w can be chosen from someone's bottom and that no one ever manipulates to w.
It is clear that this rule satisfies anonymity. We next show it satisfies Pareto and hence is Condorcet. That is, we want to show that if f(u) = á, there is no â such that both prefer â to á. This is obvious if f(u) = á via Steps 1 or 2. So suppose that f(u) = á by Step 3. Then one individual has initial segment either áâ or âá. Clearly if the initial segment is áâ, there is no alternative both prefer to á. But if the initial segment is âá, the only possible alternative both prefer to á is â. But if the other individual also prefers â to á, then á wouldn't have been chosen.
Finally we show G(f) = 1. So suppose that f(u) = á; we want to show no one can improve to an outcome two or more ranks higher in their ordering.
1. f(u) = á arises from Step 1. An individual with w on their top can not improve at all, and the other individual can not affect the outcome.
f(u) = á arises from
Step 2. Each individual has á as their top and so can not improve at all.
Step 3. Some individual has áâ or âá as her initial segment; the other individual's initial segment appears later in the list and that individual prefers á to â (and so can't gain three ranks). Now the first individual can not improve two ranks (or three) since á is in their initial segment of length two. The only way the other individual could improve two ranks would be if they had ordering ãäáâ and could precipitate the selection of ã. But since ãä is later in the list than the first individual's initial segment, the other would have to submit an ordering with one of ãá, ãâ, áã, or âã as initial segment. But then since the first individual prefers each of á and â to ã, alternative ã wouldn't be chosen.
The fact that n = 2 in Example 4.3 is crucial for obtaining G(f) = 1.
Open Question: For m $ 3 and even n $ 4, does every Condorcet social choice rule f
We next show that if we strengthen the Condorcet condition slightly, the answer is "yes."
With even n, the Condorcet condition is weak. We can strengthen it by requiring that if at profile u there exist alternatives that are not defeated by majority vote, then f(u) is one of those 
Theorem 5.2 (Second Condorcet Gain Theorem). For even n $ 2, and any fully
Condorcet rule f, G(f) $ m-2.
Proof: Let t be the selection rule for f. Without loss of generality, we assume that t({x,y,z}) = x and t({y,z}) = y. We start by analyzing standard scoring rules that employ just two score values, which, 2 without loss of generality, we take to be 0 and 1. Consider f where 1 is assigned to the bottom t 11 2 ranks and 0 is assigned to each individual's top t ranks where t + t = m and ties are broken alphabetically. This is a kind of approval voting, but one in which the number of approvals is the same for every individual and every profile. We now determine G(f). Construct profile u:
Now that we know t > 1, construct profile u:
where a is in everyone's t position. Then f(u) = a. But if u* is created by #1 interchanging a and 
where every alternative except a and b appears in someone's last t ranks and v appears there at 3 least twice (recall nt $ m). Then the sum of scores for a and b is p while the sum of scores for any other alternative is at least 1. Since a and b are tied, the tie break gives f(u) = a. Now if #1 12 interchanges a and v, then b has the smallest sum of scores and #1 gains t + t -1 ranks.
1
Subcase 2. t = 1. Suppose first that n is even. Consider profile u:
12 interchanges a and v, then b has the smallest sum of scores and #1 gains t + t -1 ranks. 21 2 For the case of odd n, note first that if t = 1 also, then t + t -1 = 1 and we know G(f) $ 2 1 by Gibbard-Satterthwaite. So we may assume that t > 1. Consider profile u where all 3 alternatives except a and b appear at least once in the bottom t while z appears at least twice in the 3 bottom t : Part 2. We next show f allows a gain of at least t + t -1. If t # t , then this is settled by 12 31 3 our proof in Part 1 that G(f) $ t + t -1. So we assume that t > t and in particular, that t > 1 and m > 3.
Case 1. t > 1. Consider profile u:
where every alternative appears at least once in someone's bottom t (recall nt $ m). Since t > t , we can ensure that for each alternative in X\{a,b} there are at least as many appearances in the We first treat what happens when n is even. Consider u:
where a and b alternate as tops for individuals 2, 3, ... , n -1. Every alternative appears at least 32 3 once in the bottom t . With lowest sum, b = f(u). Then #1 gains t + t -1 ranks by interchanging a and c.
If n is odd, Consider profile u:
Subcase C1: ñ(f) = t + t . Again we first treat the case where t > 1. Consider profile u:
where every alternative appears at least once in someone's bottom t + t (recall n(t + t ) $ m).
Alternatives a and b have sum p while all other alternatives have sum at least p. By the alphabetic 12 tie-break, f(u) = a. If now #2 interchanges a and c, alternative b wins and #2 gains t + t -1 = ñ(f) 1 -1. Next suppose that t = 1 and n is even. Consider profile u: If t = 1 also, then t + t -1 = 1 and we know G(f) $ 1 by Gibbard-Satterthwaite. So we assume 2 that t > 1. Consider the profile
Then a and b have sum p(n+1)/2, while all other alternatives have sum at least np. Hence, f(u) = a.
12
If #3 interchanges a and e, then b wins and #2 gains t + t -1 = ñ(f) -1.
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Subcase C2: ñ(f) = m. We want to show G(f) $ Max{t + t -1, t + t -1}. The 12 12 argument above for the case ñ(f) = t + t also suffices here to show G(f) $ t + t -1. We need only show G(f) $ t + t -1. Of course, if t + t -1 # t + t -1, i.e., if t # t , we are done. So we 31 3 assume that t > t , and, in particular, t > 1.
12 3
We now claim that for standard scoring rules with three scores and fixed n, m, t , t , and t , such that n(t + t ) $ m, nt < m, and t > t , we have (1) ñ(f) = t + t if p < 1/n and (2) ñ(f) = m if 21 2 someone's middle t . Bringing that alternative down to rank t + t doesn't change the outcome, so 12 ñ (f) = t + t .
If p $ 1/n, consider profile u:
Here any alternative other than a that appears in the top tier appears only once (possible since nt < 31 m) and also appears once somewhere in the bottom tier (possible since t > t ). The sum for a is 1.
The sum for any other alternative appearing in the top tier is at least 1 + (n-2)p. The sum for any alternative that does not appear in the top tier is at least np. Since np $ 1, alternative a at least ties for least sum and then, by the tie-break, f(u) = a and ñ(f) = m.
So, for Subcase C2, ñ(f) = m and we have p $ 1/n. We must distinguish between those cases where 1/n # p < 1/(n-1) and those where 1/(n-1) # p < 1.
Subcase C2A. 1/n # p < 1/(n-1).
Consider profile u:
Here any alternative other than a that appears in the top tier appears only once (possible since nt < 31 m) and also appear once somewhere in the bottom tier (possible since t > t ). The sum for a is 1. Subcase C2B. 1/(n-1) # p < 1.
1
Suppose first that t > 1. And consider profile u:
Here any alternative other than a or b that appears in the top tier appears only once (possible since 
12
Consider t = 1. Suppose t > 1. Let k be the smallest integer such that 1/k # p < 1. So (k-1)p < 1 # kp. Let z = n -(k-1) and hence n-z = k-1.
Here any alternative other than a that appears in the top tier appears only once (possible since nt < 31 m) and also appears at least once somewhere in the bottom tier (possible since t > t ). The sum for a is 1 + (z-1)p. The sum for b is np. Note that 1 + (z-1)p # np because 1 # kp. Thus f(u) = a.
But if #1 interchanges b and c, then b's sum falls to (n-1)p and (n-1)p < 1 + (z-1)p since (k-1)p < 23 1. Thus b now is chosen and #1 has gained t + t -1 ranks. S ubsection 6.3. m values.
Now suppose that n < n < . . . < n < n . We will treat here only the case n $ m (which s is the analog of nt $ m for each s, inasmuch as each alternative can appear in each tier). and n < n < . . . < n < n . Then G(f) = m-2.
Proof: Suppose that n is even and greater than 2. First, no one can manipulate from their bottom tier to their top tier, because one can't unilaterally reduce the score in one's top tier or increase the score of an alternative in one's bottom tier; so G(f) # m-2. Consider profile u: In the following theorem, given without proof, there is no restriction on the parity of n. (1) If ñ(f) = m, then G(f) $ m -2;
